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Abstract—Differentiated Services (DiffServ) provides a means
for applications to classify trafﬁc into Quality of Service (QoS)
classes by reading the Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP)
ﬁeld in the IP header and then mapping trafﬁc to a speciﬁc QoS
forwarding treatment. This paper provides new measurement
data that examines how the DSCP is altered as packets traverse
mobile broadband access networks. Results are presented for en-
tire paths, differentiating between the access network behaviour
and the rest of the path. Observing the DSCP seen at each router
can be used to infer whether a packet is likely to receive an
appropriate QoS treatment, and hence the level of support for
DiffServ QoS. Our results identify two remarking pathologies,
one for the mobile networks and the other for the Internet path.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile networks have become performance-focused as a
result of devices being used for streaming media content
and for interactive applications [1]. These applications have
a diverse range of network needs, many are sensitive to
packet loss, performance is often impacted by delay, and some
applications can consume signiﬁcant capacity. The DiffServ
model allows applications to classify trafﬁc into QoS treatment
classes by setting the DiffServ ﬁeld in the header of an IPv4
or IPv6 packet. The marking in this ﬁeld, or DSCP, informs
the QoS treatment those packets receive.
Against the backdrop of increased interest in inter-domain
DiffServ, the Prioritisation and Resilience in Emergency Com-
munications (PREC) Experiment of the Measuring Mobile
Broadband Networks (MONROE) Project is exploring whether
mobile services can be combined with prioritised radio ser-
vices to offer a QoS framework that is resilient and degrades
gracefully following major network disruption. A prerequisite
for this work is to understand the extent to which mobile
networks pass DSCP markings, and speciﬁcally to understand
how and where any changes take place. The desire for trans-
port encryption further motivates a DiffServ approach, since
options such as deep packet inspection can not be used to
classify encrypted network trafﬁc.
This paper explores path-level behaviour of DiffServ en-
abled packets in mobile networks to potentially identify be-
haviour which does not comply with the IETF speciﬁcation
or which has an undesired effect. For example, unexpected
packet drops due to the use of a DSCP or instances of “priority
inversion” where higher priority packets are remarked to a
lower priority while other priorities are not remarked. Our
study presents results from a survey using the MONROE
platform. The measurement explore how DiffServ-marked
packets are treated within a mobile operator’s network and
at its boundaries.
The following sections discuss the background to our study
and details the experiment design. The results are then pre-
sented and discussed in the context of ongoing work in the
IETF concerning WebRTC QoS [2] and DiffServ Interconnec-
tion [3]. We also present the implications of our results for
DiffServ-enabled applications in a mobile environment and
summarise our ﬁndings in the conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND TO DIFFERENTIATED SERVICES
The classiﬁcation of trafﬁc in Internet networks was ﬁrst
provided by the 8-bit Type of Service (ToS) ﬁeld of the IPv4
header [4]. The ﬁrst three of these bits served to classify trafﬁc
into 8 priority classes, and the remainder to specify the type of
trafﬁc sent. The small number of usable classes and the lack
of support for relative priorities and drop precedence lead to
the replacement of this framework.
In 1998 the DiffServ architecture repurposed the ToS
ﬁeld[5] [6], allocating the ﬁrst 6 bits to specify a DSCP. The
last 2 bits in the ﬁeld were reserved for Explicit Congestion
Notiﬁcation, Explicit Congestion Notiﬁcation (ECN).
The DSCP values are divided into three pools. The ﬁrst
pool of 32 codepoints is assigned to the IETF, of which 22
have registered well-known meanings. Table I speciﬁes the
commonly used codepoints and the classes inherited from
backwards compatibility with the ToS ﬁeld painted by the
Class Selector (CS) codepoints.
Applications can implement QoS using DiffServ by setting
the DSCP in the IP header. Routers at the ingress to a DiffServ
domain [5] read the DSCP of each packet, and use this
to decide how to treat the packet within the network. At
the edge of a domain trafﬁc conditioners determine if the
DSCP marking is permitted. Unexpected DSCP values may be
remarked (e.g., resetting to the default DSCP), packets may
be shaped or dropped (the latter is not recommended [7]).
The DiffServ ﬁeld controls admission to QoS classes when
the DSCPs are mapped to a Behaviour Aggregate (BA) [5].
This causes the packet to enter a queue serviced by one
of a set of speciﬁed forwarding treatments, known as Per-
Hop Behaviours (PHBs). A simple treatment could map all
DSCPs to a default (FIFO) PHB, the same as a network
that does not implement DiffServ. The IETF also deﬁnes a
range of standard PHBs and associates each with a well-
known DSCP or collection of DSCPs, including the Assured
TABLE I
COMMONLY USED CODEPOINTS
Binary Decimal PHB class Priority
000000 0 BE Default, CS0
001000 8 CS1 Priority, Class Selector 1
001010 10 AF11 Low drop probability
001100 12 AF12 Medium drop probability
001110 14 AF13 High drop probability
010000 16 CS2 Immediate, Class Selector 2
010010 18 AF21 Low drop probability
010100 20 AF22 Medium drop probability
010110 22 AF23 High drop probability
011000 24 CS3 Flash, Class Selector 3
011010 26 AF31 Low drop probability
011100 28 AF32 Medium drop probability
011110 30 AF33 High drop probability
100000 32 CS4 Flash Override, Class Selector 4
100010 34 AF41 Low drop probability
100100 36 AF42 Medium drop probability
100110 38 AF43 High drop probability
101000 40 CS5 Critical/ECP, Class Selector 5
101100 44 VA Voice Admit
101110 46 EF Expedited Forwarding
110000 48 CS6 Internetwork Control, Class Selector 6
111000 56 CS7 Network control, Class Selector 7
Forwarding (AF) PHB [8] and the Expedited Forwarding (EF)
PHB [9]. Operators may also implement their own PHBs and
16 codepoints (pool 2) are assigned for local operator use,
and a further 16 have been provisionally assigned but may be
utilised for future standardised assignments.
During its transmission across the Internet, a packet is likely
to cross many networks and DiffServ domains. The ability to
provide QoS treatment across networks relies on coordinated
network operator effort to implement service policies. Where
there is no such cooperation, there are no guarantees that
the packet will receive the expected treatment, or that the
contents of the DiffServ ﬁeld will be forwarded intact. This has
lead to DiffServ being perceived as an unreliable mechanism
for requesting QoS treatment beyond the local network or
administrative domain.
Recent work in ITU-T [10] and the IETF [3] has shown
renewed interest in inter-domain use of DiffServ to help
realise consistent QoS treatment within networks using MPLS.
A recent GSMA document [11] that provides guideline for
mobile backbones also helps coordinate inter-domain use of
DSCPs within mobile networks.
III. RELATED WORK
A recent small-scale study [12] provided insight into end-to-
end path behaviour when sending DSCP-marked packets from
edge networks (mostly wireless), with mixed results. Results
were presented for 185 paths showing DSCP-related failure for
10 to 13% of packets with speciﬁc codepoints. It also identiﬁed
remarking behaviour on paths, most notably remarking to 0
and remarking to unassigned DSCPs. In comparison, this paper
focuses on mobile edge networks to classify behaviour of
routers along a path in the context of the DiffServ architecture.
A number of techniques have been used to measure various
modiﬁcations of packets along Internet paths. The Trace-
box [13] tool has measured modiﬁcations of the DiffServ
ﬁeld along the paths of 14,373 address pairs. It found a
5.75% modiﬁcation rate for this ﬁeld, but did not further
explore the modiﬁcations. A study by CAIDA [14] analysed
ICMP quotations resulting from sending probes to 84393 web
servers, ﬁnding an in-ﬂight modiﬁcation rate of 2.9% for the
DSCP/ECN byte, but did not seek to identify where and in
what way this modiﬁcation occurred.
A large scale measurement study [15] investigated the end-
to-end path transparency for Explicit Congestion Notiﬁcation,
ECN across the Alexa top 1 million web servers. The study
found that for IPv4 hosts, 94.8% successfully received the
ECN codepoint intact. In the context of this paper, we note
that the ECN ﬁeld is a part of the same byte as the DSCP
ﬁeld in the IP header. This provides some evidence that the
majority of routers in the core of the Internet do not bleach
(set to zero) the whole byte.
PATHspider [16] recently added a DSCP plugin for testing
codepoint-dependent connectivity failure. Tests were run in
September 2016 and January 2017 to test for connectivity
failure in the Internet core from seven vantage points hosted by
Digital Ocean in Amsterdam, Frankfurt, London, New York,
San Francisco, Singapore, Toronto and Bangalore. Connec-
tions to the same 673,230 IP addresses from each vantage point
found no evidence of DSCP-dependent failure for 99.95% of
the targets tested for DSCP 46 (EF). The implication for this
study is that packets which exit a mobile access network will
not experience DSCP-dependent connectivity failure for the
remainder of their path.
IV. EXPERIMENT DESIGN
We developed a tool used for measuring the DSCP marking
behaviour of deployed mobile networks, inspired by [13]. The
tool has three components: an active trafﬁc generator, a packet
capture module and an analysis module. Figure 1 illustrates
the tool architecture. It is important to note this tool does not
assess the deployment of PHBs, since we do not have a way
to measure the QoS experienced at the received endpoint nor
the level of congestion at the routers on the network path.
The trafﬁc generator component is based on the Scapy1
packet forging library and sent packets towards a target IP ad-
dress. A packet capture module ran in the background, record-
ing all received Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
type 11 messages associated with the test. A measurement
vantage point is the system and associated network interface
that forwarded the generated trafﬁc and captured the ICMP
replies. Initially, packets are sent with an IPv4 Time-to-Live
(TTL) (or IPv6 Hop Count) value of 1. Each router forwarding
a packet decrements the TTL. If a router ﬁnds that the TTL
has expired (has a value 0), an ICMP type 11 (Time to Live
Exceeded in Transit) or ICMPv6 type 3 (Hop Limit Exceeded
in Transit) message is generated and sent to the sender of the
packet. These ICMP messages also contain a quotation of the
1http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy/
packet that triggered their generation, typically containing at
least the IP and transport layer headers.
After each round of captured ICMP messages, the requests
and ICMP messages were recorded and grouped into ﬂows.
Autonomous System (AS) information was added for the
routers originating the ICMP messages were determined using
RIPEstat API2. The TTL was then incremented, and the
process repeated, up to a maximum of 30 hops. The ﬂow
and AS information for each hop were then processed by an
analysis module, enabling us to make path observations. Some
routers are known to either ﬁlter ICMP packets, or to rate-limit
their generation. This will result in no collected samples for
these routers. A study [17] on trafﬁc differentiation and loss
rate measured the correlation between packet loss and ICMP
type 11 rate limiting for probes sent at different intervals and
found that one probe per second per path did not trigger rate
limiting in routers.
Our tool was used in a measurement campaign between
December 2016 and February 2017 to collect DiffServ path-
level data for packets sent from mobile-edge sources. We
tested both TCP (using SYN packets with a high-numbered
TCP port) and UDP (using datagrams with a high-numbered
UDP port). Port 53 was not used for UDP, since we observed
that some mobile operators block DNS queries to encourage
use of a carrier-provided DNS service. Similarly, trafﬁc with
TCP port 80 may be redirected to web proxies in the mobile
edge network. The target IP addresses were drawn from a
random selection from the Alexa Topsites list3.
We used the MONROE mobile platform. This provides
dedicated infrastructure for Mobile Broadband (MBB) exper-
imentation [18] and comprises over 250 mobile connected
nodes distributed in four European countries: Italy, Spain,
Norway and Sweden. Each node on the platform is connected
to up to three MBB providers and often also to WiFi. The
platform was designed for experiments to measure the perfor-
mance and reliability of MBB networks and has support for
metadata collection. It provides “Experiments as a Service”
to its external users facilitating experiment executions via
Docker containers. The number of vantage points for our
measurements in each country and the list of providers is
detailed in table II.
V. RESULTS
Data from over 107 mobile vantage points spanning 12
MBB providers was collected against a target list of 86 IPv4
targets, for a total of 9202 different source-destination pairs.
For each pair, for both TCP and UDP, the following codepoints
were sent: Best Effort (BE), CS1, AF11, AF21 AF31, AF41,
CS5, EF, and the unassigned codepoints: 2 and 3.
Finally, due to the scheduling availability of nodes within
the platform, the amount of data collected for each DSCP
and transport protocol varies. Different DSCPs will not be
compared against each other unless a signiﬁcant amount of
data has been collected from the same vantage point.
2https://stat.ripe.net/
3http://www.alexa.com/topsites
Fig. 1. Block diagram illustrating the architecture of our traceroute-like tool
used in our measurements and the ﬂow of trafﬁc during use.
TABLE II
COUNTRY/MBB OPERATOR INFORMATION
Country Italy Spain Sweden Norway
Operator 1 Vodafone Orange Telenor Telenor
Operator 2 TIM Yoigo Telia Telia
Operator 3 WIND Vodafone HI3G NetCom
Vantage points 38 36 23 10
A. Transport-Dependent Remarking
To detect transport dependent remarking, we used data
collected from the same 16 vantage points considering TCP
and UDP ﬂows. This used 1376 address-destination pairs per
transport, distributed across 8 mobile operators in 3 countries.
We compared the remarking results for UDP trafﬁc against
those for TCP trafﬁc. Table III presents DSCP modiﬁcation
pathology data, while table IV presents the percentage for TCP
versus UDP at the last observed hop when sending EF.
The results for TCP and UDP agreed within a margin of
1%. We suggest this small difference is a result of transient
measurement conditions such as congestion or ICMP rate
limiting, and conclude we saw no evidence of transport-
dependent remarking of a DSCP. This is consistent with our
expectation that DiffServ processing occurs at the network-
layer. We therefore combine results for TCP and UDP tests
TABLE III
SUMMARY RESULTS FOR DSCP MODIFICATION PATHOLOGIES, TCP
VERSUS UDP SUMMARY
TCP UDP Description
478 routers 461 routers
routers pct routers pct
411 85.9% 399 86.5% Transparent
30 3.4% 26 5.6% Reset DiffServ ﬁeld
24 1.0% 24 5.2% Reset upper 3 bits of DiffServ
ﬁeld
12 2.5% 20 2.6% Other remarking
TABLE IV
SUMMARY RESULTS FOR THE CODEPOINTS SEEN AT THE LAST OBSERVED
HOP OF THE PATH FOR THE EF CODEPOINT, TCP VERSUS UDP
TCP UDP DSCP
581 paths 581 paths Observed
paths pct paths pct
223 38.3% 225 38.7% BE
281 48.3% 278 47.8% EF
46 7.9% 49 8.4% 6 †
14 2.4% 14 2.4% CS1
7 1.2% 7 1.2% 41 ‡
10 1.7% 8 1.3% Others
† This non-standard codepoint can be the result of the
higher 3 bits of the DSCP ﬁeld being bleached.
‡ This is a non-standard codepoint whose presence
cannot be explained by common bit level manipulations
that have been observed.
TABLE V
NUMBER OF NETWORKS TRAVERSED WITHOUT MANIPULATION OF A
CODEPOINT (9202 paths)
1 2 3 4 5 >5 ∞
BE 28.6% 22.9% 22.7% 22.6% 22.3% 22% 21.4%
3 15.2% 8.3% 8.3% 8.3% 7.5% 7.2% 6.3%
CS1 40.4% 35.6% 35.6% 35.0% 31.2% 28.1% 24.0%
AF11 46.4% 39.1% 38.8% 37.9% 34.2% 30.7% 25.8%
AF21 43.4% 38.8% 38.8% 34.9% 30.7% 27.0% 23.1%
AF31 40.5% 35.6% 35.6% 35.0% 31.5% 28.0% 24.1%
AF41 40.4% 35.6% 35.6% 35.2% 31.6% 27.5% 23.1%
CS4 39.6% 34.8% 34.8% 34.5% 30.6% 27.1% 23.1%
EF 40.3% 35.6% 35.6% 35.3% 31.5% 28.0% 23.8%
from distinct vantage points in the following subsections to
increase our dataset. This combined data spans 12 mobile
operators in 4 countries and 9202 address-destination pairs.
B. Preservation of DSCP marking across networks
Mobile networks usually place their IPv4 users behind a
NAT, to conserve public address space. On average, the packets
we sent traversed at least 2 (2.58) hops before exiting an
operator network. This was calculated as the number of hops
up to the ﬁrst public address seen on the path. However, these
ﬁrst hops on the path are the most likely to have been affected
by ICMP rate limiting, and expect this number to be higher
[19]. Table V considers DSCP remarking by number of hops
traversed.
Between 8.3% and 39.1% of DSCPs traversed the second
hop on the path without remarking. This is an indication of
remarking within operator networks, with almost two-thirds
of the DSCPs overwritten within the ﬁrst hops on the path.
Surprisingly, this is also the case for DSCP 0, which was
expected to remain unchanged, but saw a 77.1% change before
exiting the operator’s network. Unknown codepoint 3 sees by
far the most aggressive remarking, with more than 90% of
packets remarked before exiting the operator’s network.
Table VI shows remarking at the ﬁrst hop of the operator
network. Each row shows the DSCP sent, and the rate of
remarking for that DSCP. At the ﬁrst hop on the path, we
observed that packets were remarked irrespective of the initial
DSCP value, to either 0 (BE), 10 (AF11), 12 (AF12), 14
TABLE VI
COMMON REMARKING SEEN AT FIRST HOP
BE AF11 AF12 AF21 AF14 Total
0 (BE) N/A 12.6% 21% 10.5% 27.2% 71.3%
3 10.3% 12.8% 23.1% 12.7% 25.8% 84.8%
8 (CS1) 2.9% 5.9% 11.9% 2.9% 35.7% 59.5%
10 (AF11) 3.1% N/A 11.9% 2.9% 35.7% 53.7%
18 (AF21) 3.0% 5.9% 11.9% N/A 35.7% 56.5%
26 (AF31) 2.9% 5.9% 11.9% 2.9% 35.6% 59.4%
34 (AF41) 2.9% 5.9% 11.8% 2.9% 35.7% 59.5%
40 (CS4) 4.0% 4.0% 12.1% 4.0% 36.2% 60.4%
46 (EF) 3.0% 4.0% 12.1% 2.9% 35.7% 57.9%
TABLE VII
COMMON REMARKING AT THE LAST HOP OF THE OPERATOR NETWORK
BE Unchanged 6 AF11 Others
0 (BE) N/A 73.4% 8.9% 10.0% 7.5%
3 60.3% 8.33% 12.3% 10.9% 8.0%
8 (CS1) 53.9% 35.8% 2.3% 2.1% 5.7%
10 (AF11) 53.9% 37.7% 2.3% N/A% 5.9%
18 (AF21) 53.9% 36.1% 2.3% 2.1% 5.3%
26 (AF31) 53.8% 35.6% 2.3% 2.1% 6.0%
34 (AF41) 53.8% 35.6% 2.3% 2.1% 6%
40 (CS4) 52.9% 34.7% 3.2% 2.8% 6.2%
46 (EF) 48.1% 35.6% 2.3% 2.1% 11.7%
(AF13) and 18 (AF21). No other remarking was observed.
Between 53.7% and 84.8% of packets were remarked at this
hop.
Table VII shows the percentages of DSCPs observed at the
last hop within the operator network. Each row shows a sent
DSCP. This shows evidence of a second round of remarking,
speciﬁcally, DSCP values being reset to BE. Overall, only up
to 35% of DSCPs traverse the operator network unchanged,
and between 29% and 58% of the packets exit the operator
network with a DSCP of 0 (BE). AF11 and the unassigned
DSCP 6 also consistently appear at the last hop on the
path. DSCP 6 is explored in the following subsection, and
is consistent with routers that perform operations based on
ToS semantics.
C. DSCP remarking pathologies
This section studies the remarking pathologies of 705
routers across 63 ASs, each of which saw half or more the
number of initial DSCPs sent. Table VIII shows the result
across all hops seen.
82.9% of the surveyed routers were transparent to DSCP,
abiding by [7] hat recommends unassigned marks are for-
warded unchanged within a DiffServ domain.
6.4% of routers bleached the DiffServ ﬁeld. [5] recommends
using a default PHB when no other agreements are in place
when transiting networks. 4.7% of routers reset the upper
3 bits of the DiffServ ﬁeld. Table IX shows the remarking
pathologies for hops in the operator networks, up to the ﬁrst
public IP address. The percentage of unmodiﬁed DSCPs drops
signiﬁcantly compared to the total observed in the previous
table. Only 5% of routers were transparent to DSCP. The next
prevalent behaviour is remarking all packets to AF13 (48.3%),
followed by remarking to AF12 (21.6%), AF11(13.3%) and
TABLE VIII
SUMMARY FOR DSCP MANIPULATION PATHOLOGIES OBSERVED IN
INDIVIDUAL ROUTERS
Observations Description
701 routers
routers pct
581 82.8% Transparent
45 6.4% Reset DiffServ ﬁeld
33 4.7% Reset upper 3 bits of DiffServ
ﬁeld
22 3.1% Reset to AF13
8 1.1% Reset to AF11 and AF12
12 1.7% Other remarking
TABLE IX
DSCP MANIPULATION PATHOLOGIES OBSERVED IN OPERATOR
NETWORKS
Observations Description
60 routers
routers pct
3 5.0% Transparent
8 13.3% Reset to AF11
13 21.6% Reset to AF12
29 48.3% Reset to AF13
6 10% Reset to AF21
1 1.6% Reset DiffServ ﬁeld
AF21(10%). There is little evidence of DSCP bleaching and
no evidence of ToS-based remarking within the operator
networks.
D. Country and operator dependent remarking
We explored observed remarking pathologies, grouping
results by country and operator. The Spanish, Italian and
Swedish operators fully remarked all codepoints for the
dataset. Italian operators remarked to AF11 (Wind, TIM)
and AF12 (Vodafone); Spanish operators remarked to AF21
(Orange), AF12 (Yoigo, Vodafone occasionally) and AF11
(Vodafone); Norwegian operators remarked to AF13 (Telenor,
Telia, NetCom), but not consistently; and Swedish ones to BE
(Telenor), AF11 (HI3G) and AF13 (Telia Mobile). Packets
with a DSCP of AF21 were remarked to BE for Vodafone in
Spain, whereas packets with other marks were remarked to
AF21.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Impact of MBB remarking
Inside the operator networks that we studied, we observed
remarking to several values dependent on country and mobile
operator. This was irrespective of the DSCP sent, implying a
remarking to a non-BE default PHB or a different network-
wide DiffServ policy. In the case of Orange in Spain, all trafﬁc
was remarked to AF21, apart from AF21 trafﬁc itself. This is
an example priority inversion, because trafﬁc marked CS1 was
remarked to AF21, while AF21 trafﬁc was remarked to BE.
The same happens for Italy in the case of AF11 for WIND,
where all codepoints get remarked to AF11, apart from AF11
trafﬁc itself which is remarked to BE.
4.6% of routers reset the DiffServ ﬁeld. Based on table
VII this appears the prevalent behaviour at the last hop of
an operator network, with BE constituting more than 48% of
DSCPs observed at the ﬁrst public address on a path. This
bleaching causes all packets to be treated as part of the same
BA for the remainder of their path.
B. Impact of ToS-based remarking
The most prevalent observed pathology was for routers to
reset only the highest three bits of the DiffServ ﬁeld, implying
that there are still many routers(4.7%) that apply the former
ToS semantics to this ﬁeld. However, changing the high-order
bits of the ﬁeld without updating the remainder of the ﬁeld
can lead to unknown DSCPs on the remainder of the path. As
an example, we observed DSCP 6 at the end of path results
for nearly all original DSCP values. Moreover, 38.2% of the
surveyed routers in the operator network remark packets with
a DSCP of AF13 (14) within the ﬁrst few hops of the path.
ToS bleaching performed on DSCP 14 results in packets being
assigned DSCP 6 for the remainder of the path, which explains
this DSCPs observed in the results at the end of path.
Although not ideal, the use of DiffServ with routers using
ToS semantics can be considered safe, even packets will likely
then not receive the desired PHB for the remainder of the
traversed path. If routers were conﬁgured to use DiffServ, the
rate of unknown codepoints at the end of path would signiﬁ-
cantly reduce. For example, all routers currently resetting the
ﬁrst three bits would reset the entire DiffServ ﬁeld instead
(leading to codepoint 0). A better alternative would be to pass
the DSCP value unchanged.
C. Recommendations for applications selecting a DSCP
WebRTC provides web browsers and mobile applications
with Real-Time Communication (RTC) capabilities. A set of
DSCPs for Internet use have been recommended [2]. BE is
recommended for low priority, EF for voice, and a set of AF
class markings for video trafﬁc. Our results show that trafﬁc
with these markings was deterministically remarked within
mobile networks. However, in the case of transparent mobile
networks, ToS bleaching and DiffServ bleaching were also
encountered further in the path, and may impact the ability of
the remote endpoint to determine the desired DSCP and apply
this at the remote edge. This is a pity for WebRTC, which
often utilises peer-to-peer connections.
Our results show that it is safe to enable DSCP marking
for applications. There is very little evidence of packet loss
due to using a speciﬁc DSCP or priority inversion caused
by remarking. A mobile application can expect to sometimes
exploit the beneﬁts the DiffServ locally, but is likely to
also experience aggressive remarking in the mobile network.
Beyond the carrier network, routers using ToS semantics are
the greatest hindrance, because these can lead to unknown
codepoints that prevent packets from receiving the desired
PHB in the later part of the path.
D. Recommendations for DiffServ Intercon
Work on DiffServ Interconnection [3] deﬁnes a set of four
common QoS classes and four auxiliary classes, to which Diff-
Serv marked trafﬁc may be mapped. This comes as a recent
operator interest in deploying PHBs supported by DiffServ
markings in their networks. It speciﬁcally targets the desire to
simplify operations between separately administered networks
using MPLS Short-Pipe tunnel mode for interconnection. This
has the potential to extend consistent DiffServ treatment across
network boundaries.
While there is evidence that the mobile operators already
use DiffServ within their networks, none of the non-BE
markings recommended by Intercon were amongst the ones
observed to be used by European mobile providers. We also
did not observe evidence that using any of the recommended
well-known codepoints will signiﬁcantly increase or decrease
the probability of successful traversal through current mobile
networks.
VII. CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS
This work explored DSCP traversal pathologies in mobile
networks in four countries to a set of Internet paths. Results
show remarking within the mobile networks. In most cases, the
remarking was irrespective of the initial DSCP. This suggests
that setting a DSCP value is unlikely to inﬂuence the full path
over which a packet travels. There is a high chance ( 47% and
100%) that any mark will be replaced within the ﬁrst two hops
of the path. The survivability of markings was not dependent
on the transport. All DSCPs were uniformly treated by the
mobile networks.
The paths beyond the mobile network display transparency,
although some unwanted pathologies remain resulting in non-
standard DSCP re-marking. ToS semantics were observed in
the remarking patterns. The measurement techniques presented
in this paper help identify which routers require updating. The
remarking could be be avoided by replacing or reconﬁguring
old equipment.
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